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194 O E D I P A L I S A T I O N
would, then, be a study or science not of appearances (phenomenology) 
nor ideas (ideology) but noology. If there are pure noema – or ‘thinkables’ 
– we can also imagine approaching life, not as grounded in personal con-
sciousness, but as a history of various images of thought, or what counts 
as thinking. Ideology, for example, is the image of a mind that can think 
only through an imposed or external structure; phenomenology is the 
image of a mind that forms its world and whose ideas and experiences are 
structured by a subject oriented towards truth.
In general, noology can be opposed to ideology. Instead of arguing that 
we, as proper subjects, are subjected to ideas that are false and that might 
be demystifi ed, Deleuze argues that it is the idea of a proper ‘we’ and 
assumption of the good self or ‘mind’ which precludes us from actualising 
our potential. Noology, as it is defi ned in A Thousand Plateaus, is not only 
the study of images of thought, but also claims a ‘historicity’ for images. 
The modern subject who is subjected to a system of signifi ers is therefore 
produced and has its genesis in previous relations of subjection. In addition 
to its critical function, noology therefore assumes that if images of thought 
have been created they can always be recreated, with the ideal of liberation 
from some proper image of thought being the ultimate aim. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze argues that we have failed to think truly precisely because 
we assume or presuppose an ‘image of thought’. Not only philosophy, but 
everyday notions of common sense and good sense fail to question just what 
it is to think. In this regard, the concept of mind (or, in Greek, nous) has been 
an unargued, implicit and restrictive postulate of our thinking. Noology does 
not only study what it might mean for human subjects to think; it also strives 
to imagine thought carried to its infi nite power, beyond the human.
Connective
Thought
O
OEDIPALISATION
Tamsin Lorraine
In Anti- Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari describe human beings as unfolding 
processes of individuation in constant interaction with their surroundings, 
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and they characterise three syntheses of the unconscious: connective syn-
theses that join elements into series (‘desiring- machines’, for example, 
mouth and breast), disjunctive syntheses that resonate series in metastable 
states (‘Bodies without Organs’ (BwO), for example, mouth and breast 
or head and arm or milk and stomach resonating in a state of bliss), and 
conjunctive syntheses that gather metastable states into the continuous 
experience of conscious awareness. They propose that Oedipal subjectiv-
ity is but one form that human sentience can take. The syntheses they 
describe have anoedipal as well as Oedipal forms. ‘Oedipalisation’ is a 
contemporary form of social repression that reduces the forms desire takes 
– and thus the connections desire makes – to those that sustain the social 
formation of capitalism.
Capitalism’s emphasis on the abstract quantifi cation of money and 
labour (what matters is how capital and labour circulates – not the spe-
cifi c form wealth takes or who in particular does what) encourages desire 
to permute across the social fi eld in unpredictable ways. Oedipalisation 
reduces the anarchic productivity of unconscious desire to familial forms 
of desire. Productive desire that fl ows according to immanent principles 
becomes organised in terms of ‘lack’, thus reducing the multiple forms 
desire can take to those forms that can be referred to the personal identities 
of the Oedipal triangle. On the BwO, desire is the only subject. It passes 
from one body to another, producing partial objects, creating breaks 
and fl ows, and making connections that destroy the unity of a ‘posses-
sive or proprietary’ ego (D&G 1983: 72). Oedipalisation makes it appear 
that partial objects are possessed by a person and that it is the person 
who desires. Productive desire that would fragment personal identity is 
reduced to the desire of a person who wants to fi ll in a lack. Oedipalisation 
thus ensures that the innovations of deterritorialising capital are con-
strained by the tightly bound parameters of personal identity and familial 
life (or the triangulated authority relationships that mimic Oedipus in the 
public realm).
According to Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipalisation constitutes an 
illegitimate restriction on the productive syntheses of the unconscious 
because it emphasises global persons (thus excluding all partial objects of 
desire), exclusive disjunctions (thus relegating the subject to a chronologi-
cal series of moments that can be given a coherent narrative account), and 
a segregative and biunivocal use of the conjunctive syntheses (thus reduc-
ing the identity of the subject to a coherent or static set of one side of a set 
of oppositions). The subjection of desire to a phallic paradigm results in 
a subject who experiences himself as ‘having’ an identity that is fi xed on 
either one side or the other of various oppositional divides (male or female, 
white or black), and who designates the various pleasurable and painful 
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196 O N T O L O G Y
states through which he passes in terms of the attributes of a fundamen-
tally unchanging identity.
Capitalism’s drive for ever- new sources of profi t fosters innovating fl ows 
of desire that, if left to themselves, could so alter capitalist formations that 
the latter would evolve into something else. Oedipalisation is a form of 
social repression that funnels the productive capacity of the unconscious 
back into the constricting channels of Oedipal desire. Following Oedipal 
subjectivity to its limits and beyond entails liberating unconscious pro-
duction so that desire can create new realities. Whereas Oedipal desire 
constitutes the subject as lacking the object desired, the goal of anoedipal 
desire is immanent to its process: it seeks not what it lacks but what allows 
it to continue to fl ow. In order to fl ow, anoedipal desire must mutate and 
transform in a self- differentiating unfolding implicated with the social 
fi eld of forces of which it is a part. Deleuze and Guattari reject the psy-
choanalytic contention that the only alternative to Oedipal subjectivity is 
psychosis and instead explore anoedipal fl ows of desire and the schizo who 
is a functioning subject of such desire. Their notion of the unconscious 
suggests ways of approaching its ‘symptoms’ that point to possibilities for 
creative transformation inevitably linked with social change.
Connectives
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ONTOLOGY
Constantin V. Boundas
For Deleuze, philosophy is ontology. In this sense, he is one of only two 
philosophers (the other being Emmanuel Lévinas) of the generation we 
call ‘poststructuralists’ not to demur in the face of ontology and meta-
physics. Deleuze’s ontology is a rigorous attempt to think of process and 
metamorphosis – becoming – not as a transition or transformation from one 
substance to another or a movement from one point to another, but rather 
as an attempt to think of the real as a process. It presupposes, therefore, an 
initial substitution of forces for substances and things, and of (transversal) 
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